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NOTES AND COMMENTS
AESTHETICS AND THE SINGLE BUILDING
LANDMARK
What to one man is food is to another rank poison.
Lucretius*
I. INTRODUCTION
For good reason, zoning for aesthetics alone has been disallowed
in the United States. Historically, state and local regulation of land use
solely for aesthetic purposes has been struck down as unconstitutional'
because it has been considered to be outside the limits of the state po-
lice power, and impermissible under the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. This argument rests mainly
on two premises. The first is that "beauty" cannot be defined by any-
one, much less by a collection of individuals.' The second premise is
that whatever "beauty" may be, it changes so quickly that nothing bet-
ter than a fleeting definition can be agreed upon? The courts, in hold-
ing legislation based entirely on aesthetics to be unconstitutional, have
avoided discussing or deciding the issue of what is aesthetically pleas-
* DE RERUM NATURA, IV, 637.
1. Zoning, since the Supreme Court decided Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Really Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926), has been considered a valid exercise of the police power, as is other land use regulation
so long as it protects the health, safety, and morals of the populace. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887). See also Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915). On the history of zoning for aesthetics, see generally R. ANDERSON, ZONING
LAW AND PRACTICE IN NEW YORK STATE, §§ 7.04-7.15 (1963 and 1972 cum. supp.); Crumplar,
Architectural Controls: Aesthetic Regulation of the Urban Environment, 6 URB. LAW. 622 (1974);
Dukeminier, Zoningfor Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 218
(1955); Masotti & Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning andthe Police Power, 46 J. URB. L. 773 (1969); Norton,
Police Power, Planning andAesthetics, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 171 (1967); Rodda, The Acconlish-
ment ofAesthetic Purfposes Under the Police Power, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 149 (1954); Comment,
Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 81 (1964); Comment, Aesthetic
Zoning: Preservation of Historic Areas, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 729 (1961); Note, Beyond the Eye of
the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1438 (1973); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222
(1968); A Bibliography ofPeriodicalLiterature Relating to the Law ofHistoric Preservation, 36 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 442 (1971).
2. See note 166 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 12-19 infra and accompanying text.
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ing. Recently, however, and regrettably, judicial approval of land use
regulation for aesthetic purposes alone has emerged and has gained
support
This comment will focus on recent litigation concerning the pres-
ervation of aesthetic landmarks under state and local ordinances.'
4. See, e.g., People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, (1963). See
also notes 32-35 infra and accompanying text.
5. This comment deals with state and local, as opposed to federal, landmark legislation. But
see notes 134-60 infra and accompanying text.
Although it has caused far less litigation than state and local legislation, federal law providing
for the registration and protection of landmarks is susceptible to similar challenges on aesthetic
grounds. The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470b, 470c, 470f, 470h,
470i, 4701-470t (1976), provides for listing property on the National Register of Historic Places but
does not prohibit alteration or even demolition of such property. The Internal Revenue Code,
however, offers an incentive for refurbishing and penalizes demolition of registered landmarks.
Tax Reform Act of 1976, I.R.C. § 191, as amended by Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600,92
Stat. 2900, 2903. The tax consequences under Section 191 of The Tax Reform Act of 1976 are
briefly these: Depreciable structures, individually listed on the National Register or in districts
listed on the National Register, are eligible for (1) accelerated depreciation for approved rehabili-
tation, (2) five-year amortization of expenses in connection with approved rehabilitaton, (3) ten
percent investment tax credit for rehabilitation of certain historic buildings, (4) denial of demoli-
tion costs as a business expense deduction, and (5) denial of accelerated depreciation for new
buildings constructed on the site of demolished historic structures. See Helvering v. United States
Trust Co., IlI F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 678 (1940), where in answer to any chal-
lenge of these provisions as constituting a taking, the court stated that no individual has a vested
right in the provisions of a tax statute. See generally Hessel, Tax Incentivesfor Preservation and
Rehabilitation ofHistoric Properties, 5 REAL ESTATE TAX'N 5 (1977).
The most recent addition to the collection of federal laws on historic preservation is the
Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act of 1974, 16 U.S.C. §§ 469a-1 to c (1976). This Act
provides funding for the recovery of scientific, prehistoric, historic, and archaeological data which
may be lost because of federal construction projects.
The Historic Sites Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1976), provides the strongest federal
control, that is, the authorization for the government to acquire sites of national historical signifi-
cance subject to an appropriation by Congress. This delegation was upheld as constitutional in
Barnidge v. United States, 101 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1939), but has scarcely been used. This Act
provided for designation of a building as a National Historic Landmark. Such landmarks are
given no protection beyond that of registered buildings, except that they may be acquired.
The opinion of the Solicitor's Office of the Department of the Interior is that registration of a
landmark building or district pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 does not
violate constitutional due process requirements, either procedurally or substantively. See Letter
from James D. Webb, Associate Solicitor, Conservation and Wildlife, Department of the Interior,
to Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky (March 3, 1978) reprinted
in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 677 (1979). The Solicitor's Office
cites the Act as not placing any use restriction on registered property. See also Helvering v.
United States Trust Co, IlI F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 678 (1940), for the proposi-
tion that the tax incentives to preserve, not demolish, landmarks involve no property right; Vir-
ginia Historic Landmarks Comm'n v. Board of Supervisors, 217 Va. 468, 230 S.E.2d 449 (1976)
(upholding landmark recognition alone of historic value as no state action triggering procedural
due process inquiries). In its regulations, the National Parks Services of the Department of the
Interior sets forth the notice and opportunity to comment procedure in the registration process. 36
C.F.R. Part 60 (1979).
The National Register lists several criteria for the registration of landmarks. These criteria
permit listing of districts, sites, buidings, structures, and objects possessing integrity of location,
design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association that (1) are associated with events
2
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Three cases will be utilized to illustrate the dangers inherent in govern-
mental determinations of what is aesthetically pleasing and the costs to
society of imposing regulations on private owners of single building
landmarks with respect to the admixture of new styles of architecture.
It is the thesis of this comment that judicial or legislative determina-
tions of what is aesthetically pleasing cannot properly be made.
Neither courts nor legislatures are adequately equipped to make such
determinations because "beauty" is incapable of being defined. The
nature of "beauty" is such that it is subject to the varied likes and dis-
likes of the populace. Neither governmental body has the expertise to
formulate a definition that would be acceptable to a majority of indi-
viduals. Furthermore, such governmental definitions of what is aes-
thetically pleasing cannot be developed with sufficient certainty to
determine what buildings should be designated as landmarks. As such,
regulations which attempt to do so are unconstitutionally vague6 to the
extent they rely on aesthetics. These regulations fail to articulate a suf-
ficiently precise standard for a landmark commission determination of
which buildings should be designated landmarks, and are outside the
permissible limits of the police power.
II. THE BACKGROUND TO ZONING AND AESTHETICS
A. The Legislation
Regulation of the use of privately owned land by the government,
be it state or municipal, is permitted by the Constitution. Such regula-
tion does not constitute a taking of that property without the payment
significant in the nation's history-, or (2) are associated with persons significant in our nations; or,
(3) "embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction, or that
represent the work of a master, or that possess high artistic values, or that represent a significant
and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction." 16 U.S.C. § 470
(Supp. 1979); 36 C.F.R. § 60.6 (1979). In the event any actual limitation on the use of buildings
listed on the National Register should be enacted, therefore, aesthetic standards alone, as allowed
by the registration system, would be at issue. See also Gray, The Response f Federal Legislation
to Historic Preservation, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 314 (1971), Hanslin, Federal Framework For
Historic Landmark Protection, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 31
(1979).
6. Although this comment does not discuss the argument that such ordinances are unconsti-
tutionally vague, that issue merits some consideration. Whether a person of ordinary intelligence
would be required to guess at the standards utilized in determining whether a building should be
designated as a landmark and whether two persons would differ as to the application of those
standards is very likely. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); Note, The
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1098 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960). See also
United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1977) (Antiquities Act unconstitutionally vague).
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of just compensation so long as the regulation protects the public
health, safety, or welfare. Some courts have held that aesthetic consid-
erations alone are a valid basis for the exercise of the police power
apart from the traditional categories. Other jurisdictions have held that
protection of the public welfare includes aesthetics.
The problems inherent in extending the limits of the police power
far enough to allow the state or locality to forbid certain uses of land
merely on account of aesthetics are brought into particularly sharp fo-
cus by the recent wave of litigation concerning landmark preservation
laws. This legislation, while not expressly labeled as zoning, has been
treated by the courts as such.' Typically, such an ordinance establishes
a board or commission which is authorized to designate a building or
neighborhood as landmark property. Aesthetics alone may be the
stated basis for a designation.8 Generally, the ordinance forbids any
destruction or modification of a designated building without the com-
mission's approval. That approval may be granted or denied solely on
the basis of aesthetic considerations. '
While landmark preservation legislation has been challenged as
effecting a taking without just compensation, 9 the current public enthu-
siasm for this preservation has successfully silenced the argument sup-
porting aesthetic freedom to add to or modify such buildings. Rather,
most challenges to state restriction of land use have taken aim at the
deprivation of a landowner's fullest economic exploitation of the prop-
erty. 10
There are, however, two difficulties involved in the operation of
preservation laws. First, designation of a building because of its aes-
7. See notes 76-80 infra and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAWS § 96-a (McKinney 1977) and NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE ch. 8A, §§ 205-07, 534 (1976); CRESTED BuTrE, COLO., TOWN LAWS, ch. 15, art. 15-2, § 15-
2-22 (1979).
9. See note 68 infra and accompanying text.
10. This paper focuses on the protection and preservation of buildings and architectural dis-
tricts at least in part on account of their architectural or artistic significance. The problems accom-
panying legislation regarding monuments only because of their importance in the events of history
is not discussed. In the decision that a building or neighborhood is architecturally significant and
in any subsequent decision on modification, aesthetics play a major role. See notes 86-98 infra
and accompanying text.
See generally Gertsell, Needed- A Landmark Decision, 8 URB. LAW. 213 (1976). Gertsell is of
the opinion that the justification for landmark preservation is "exclusively or predominantly aes-
thetic in nature." Id at 224. Gertsell concedes, however, that on a practical basis, the aesthetic
considerations can be supported on other grounds. "Courts seem less reluctant to find an ordi-
nance unconstitutional where the regulation imposes affirmative duties and appears to be aestheti-
cally motivated." Id at 225. He suggests that in aesthetics cases, courts should balance the
various interests.
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thetic virtues, alone, may be outside the scope of the police power. Sec-
ond, denial of permission to alter a building merely because the
proposed addition would violate the commission's notion of a struc-
ture's aesthetic merit may also be unconstitutional. Moreover, the pro-
hibition on modem additions to privately owned historic structures is
too often a ban on creativity as well as on full development of the eco-
nomic value of the property. A state decision that yesterday's structure
is beautiful, and that its alteration would impair or destroy its aesthetic
integrity, is indeed one generation's feast which may poison another.
B. *hat is Art?
In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., I Mr. Justice Holmes
clearly set forth the danger inherent in judicial decisions that attempt to
define art. Justice Holmes stated:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations .... [S]ome works of genius
would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new lan-
guage in which their author spoke. It may be more than
doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the
paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when
seen for the first time. 12
When courts and legislative bodies have endeavored to determine
what "art" is, their efforts have been reluctant and strained, to say
nothing of unsatisfactory. Customs cases for example, which have been
the most frequent source of such definitions, have treated "fine art" as a
subset of all art. 3 At an early date, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals developed the "representational test" for fine art in United
States v. Olivotti & Co. 11 Under the representational test, sculpture
qualified as a branch of the fine arts: carvings out of solid materials
imitating natural objects, chiefly in human form, in realistic propor-
11. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
12. Id at 251. See generally 1 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL
ARTS 3-I to 3-6 (1979). See also Derenberg & Baum, Congress Rehabilitates Modern Art, 34
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1228 (1959), in which the authors discuss the 1959 amendments to 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1201, 1807. For a copyright definition of a work of art, as opposed to a useful article, see the
1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); J. MERRYMAN &
A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS, 3-7 to 3-29.
13. United States v. Perry, 146 U.S. 71 (1892).
14. 30 Treas. Dec. 586, 7 Ct. Cust. App. 46 (1916).
[Vol. 15:610
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tions. 15 That definition of sculpture in terms of even a layman's view is
inadequate and almost humorous. It was recognized as such when, in
1928, the famous Brancusi "Bird in Flight" case was decided. 16 Cus-
toms officials had challenged sculptor Constantin Brancusi's claim that
his bronze work "Bird in Flight," a classic piece of abstract sculpture,
was a work of art. The customs officials considered it a "manufacture
of metal." The Customs Court, recognizing the need to alter the repre-
sentational test handed down in Olivolli, stated:
[That] decision was handed down in 1916. In the mean-
while there has been developing a so-called new school of art,
whose exponents attempt to portray abstract ideas rather than
to imitate natural objects. Whether or not we are in sympathy
with these newer ideas and the schools which represent them,
we think the fact of their existence and their influence upon
the art world. . . must be considered. 7
In very significant language, the Customs Court concluded that the
sculpture was a work of art.
It is beautiful and symmetrical in outline, and while some dif-
ficulty might be encountered in associating it with a bird, it is
nevertheless pleasing to look at and highly ornamental.' 8
The inadequacy of the representational test is a superb example of
the inability of courts and legislatures to determine what is aesthetically
pleasing. Human creativity and taste are ever changing processes, re-
quiring room for growth. Hence, any efforts by bodies of law to set
precise standards on a process so constantly and necessarily changing is
impossible and arguably beyond the proper spheres of the judiciary
and legislature.' 9
III. AESTHETICS IN LAND-USE REGULATION
The major problem with permitting aesthetics to serve as a basis
for land use regulation is the fluid meaning of "aesthetics." The very
meaning of the word "aesthetics" is unclear to most people. The word
derives from the Greek word "Ecr'EO-Qo-LS" which means perception.2 °
Originally, the term "aesthetics" did not mean beauty to the exclusion
of ugliness. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "aesthetic" simply
15. Id at _ 7 Ct. Cust. App. at 48.
16. Brancusi v. United States, T.D. 43063, 54 Treas. Dec. 428 (1928).
17. Id at 430-31.
18. Id at 431.
19. See note 166 infra and accompanying text.
20. See generaljy W. BATES, PLATO'S VIEW OF ART, 32-62 (1972).
6
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as criticism of taste as a science of philosophy, though a second mean-
ing of the word is "of or pertaining to the appreciation or criticism of
the beautiful."'" Webster's New International Dictionary explains
"aesthetics" as a branch of philosophy "dealing with beauty or the
beautiful, especially in the fine arts; a theory or the theories of
beauty."22
The law with respect to zoning for aesthetic reasons alone has
changed. Until the 1920's, United States courts staunchly held that
zoning for the sole purpose of aesthetics was invalid.23 Around the
turn of the century, judicial abhorrence of land use regulation solely for
aesthetics was at its peak. In Welch v. Swasey,24 two Massachusetts
statutes limited the height of buildings in Boston but distinguished be-
tween residential and commercial buildings mainly on aesthetic
grounds. The Welch Court held aesthetics alone to be an unconstitu-
tional basis for land use regulation.2 5 The Court, however, was uncom-
fortable with the issue and stated that the presence of an aesthetic basis
for the ordinance would not invalidate it.
26
Zoning itself came before the Supreme Court in 1926, when, in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,27 the Court held that zoning was
a constitutional exercise of the police power. One year later, in Gorieb
v. Fox,28 the Supreme Court upheld set-back regulations in residential
areas of Roanoke, Virginia. The Court responded to the argument that
due process had been denied by relying upon Euclid, implying but not
stating that set-back requirements were within the traditional limits of
the police power as were light and air regulations.29
The cases dealing with zoning for aesthetics appear to fall into
three broad categories: zoning for public health and welfare; zoning
for purely aesthetic considerations; or, zoning for reasons not entirely
aesthetic.3 0 Typically, judicial rejection of purely or predominantly
aesthetic zoning has been based upon the fact that, although public
21. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 147-48 (rev. 1970).
22. WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 42 (2d ed. unabr. 1950).
23. See, e.g., St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527, 22 S.W. 861 (1893).
24. 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
25. Id at 107. According to one author, this case is the origin of the legal fictions in which
courts must indulge to uphold aesthetic regulations. See Crumplar, supra note 1, at 625.
26. 214 U.S. at 108. See also Lucking, The Regulation of Outdoor Advertising: Past, Present
and Future, 6 ENVT'AL AFFAIRS 179, 183 (1977).
27. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
28. 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
29. Id at 609.
30. See generally Lucking, supra note 26, at 660-67.
[Vol. 15:6 10
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health, safety, and morals may be at least reasonably safeguarded by
legislation, precise aesthetic standards are not susceptible of majority or
reasonable determination, at either the drafting or litigation stage.31
In People v. Stover,32 a recent case setting forth the extremes of
judicial opinion on aesthetic considerations in zoning, the New York
Court of Appeals upheld an ordinance prohibiting the erection and
maintenance of clotheslines in front or side yards abutting streets. 33
The majority held that zoning ordinances based in part on aesthetics
were subject to scrutiny only according to the rationality of the method
chosen to achieve an attractive, prosperous, efficiently functioning com-
munity. Although the court noted that aesthetics were a proper legisla-
tive concern,34 it acknowledged the city's argument that the clothesline
prohibition was intended to provide clear visibility on streets and
thereby reduce accidents,35 and noted that some cases may go too far in
the name of aesthetics.36 The court did, however, stop short of ruling
that ordinances based solely on aesthetics were constitutional.
Judge Van Voorhis, dissenting, found that the ordinance was unre-
lated to the public safety, health, morals, or welfare. 37 Rather, the dis-
sent believed that the ordinance was based solely on aesthetics.38
Reasoning that aesthetic considerations alone were an unconstitutional
basis for upholding zoning ordinances, the dissent correctly noted the
inability of a legislative body to determine what is aesthetically pleas-
ing. More significant, however, is the acknowledgment by the dissent
that courts have deliberately struck down zoning ordinances based
solely on aesthetics because of a proper fear of governmental trespass
on the human personality.39
A. Billboards and Aesthetics
The area of the law in which land use regulation for aesthetic con-
siderations has experienced the greatest development is in cases up-
31. See, e.g., City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 661, 148 N.E.
842, 844 (1925).
32. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
33. The case is noted by Anderson, Regulation ofLand Usefor 4esthetic Purposes-An Ap-
praisal of People v. Stover, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 33 (1964).
34. 12 N.Y.2d at 466-67, 191 N.E.2d at 274-75, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 737-38.
35. Id at 466, 191 N.E.2d at 274, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 736-37.
36. Id at 468, 191 N.E.2d at 275, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
37. Id at 472, 191 N.E.2d at 278, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 742. (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
38. Id at 470, 191 N.E.2d at 278, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
39. Id at 472, 191 N.E.2d at 278, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
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holding billboard prohibitions or restrictions.40 The early billboard
decisions involved ordinances and statutes that contained set-back re-
quirements and size and location restrictions. These decisions rejected
such legislation as unconstitutional when it appeared to be based either
too heavily or exclusively4 on aesthetics. Within the past fifteen years,
however, an increasing number of jurisdictions have acknowledged
aesthetics as a valid purpose for the regulation of billboards.42
There appear to be two methods by which aesthetic considerations
have been utilized as a valid basis for billboard regulation. The first
approach is the admixture of aesthetics into the safety purpose.43 This
approach is a utilization of the traditional safety goals of the police
power because billboards can easily distract drivers and pedestrians
and cause traffic accidents. The partial judicial utilization of aesthetics,
in conjunction with the police power, in upholding the billboard regu-
lation is, therefore, nothing more than finding a bonus in the plan.44
The second approach to billboard regulation is purely aesthetic
and takes the form of highway beautification and preservation of scenic
beauty. This approach to billboard regulation and aesthetics is more
troublesome. It is, however, becoming an acceptable rationale in many
jurisdictions.45 A recent example of such a case upholding aesthetics as
the sole basis for billboard regulation is Wesoeld Motor Sales Co. v.
Town of Wesofeld 46 In that case, the court held that zoning solely for
aesthetics is not outside the scope of the police power.47 The court went
even further and stated that such action need not be clothed in the legal
40. See generally Comment, The Truth About Beauty: The Changing Role o/Aesthetics in
Billboard Legislation, 9 ENVT'L L. 113 (1978) [hereinafter cited as The Truth About Beauty].
41. Id at 122. See, e.g., City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148
N.E. 842 (1925). See also General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85,
172 N.E. 309 (1930).
42. See generally The Truth About Beauty, supra n. 40. See also note 166 infra.
43. See, e.g., H.A. Steen Indus., Inc. v. Cavanaugh, 430 Pa. 10, 241 A.2d 771 (1968). On
scenic beauty see E.B. Elliot Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141 (5th
Cir.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 805 (1970).
44. The bonus is often more than aestetic improvement. The Highway Beautification Act, 23
U.S.C. §131 (1976), declares that outdoor signs near interstate highways should be controlled to
promote recreational and safety values and natural beauty. States which fail, by legislation, to
prevent the construction of outdoor signs within 660 feet within the right of way lose ten percent
of their highway funds. See generally Lucking, supra note 26; Proffit, Public Esthetics and the
Billboard, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 151 (1931); Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics and the First Amendment,
64 COLuM. L. REV. 81 (1964); The Truth About Beauty, supra note 40; Notes and Comments, City.
wide Prohibition ofBillboards: Police Power and the Freedom oSpeech, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1597
(1979).
45. See generally Lucking, supra note 26; The Truth About Beauty, supra note 40.
46. 129 N.J. Super 528, 324 A.2d 113 (1974).
47. Id at _ 234 A.2d at 122.
[Vol. 15:610
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raiment of traditional, nonaesthetic police power. The court said sim-
ply that the time had come to set the need for subterfuge aside. The
court's reasoning was primarily that modem times and trends indicate
that planning and zoning are basically aesthetic in nature,48 and that
once aesthetic zoning per se is accepted, it may be reviewed for its rea-
sonableness. 9 Other jurisdictions which accept aesthetics as a legiti-
mate basis for billboard regulation, without more,50 concentrate on the
reasonableness of the regulation.' These jurisdictions are, however, a
distinct minority.52
B. Berman v. Parker
Berman v. Parker13 remains as the latest word from the Supreme
Court on aesthetics in land use regulation. In Berman, the issue was
whether Congress, acting as the local government of Washington, D.C.,
could take, by eminent domain, an entire area of privately owned
buildings for destruction in an urban redevelopment program. The
aesthetic question involved in Berman, therefore, was beautification by
destruction of old buildings. The following words of Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, are routinely quoted by those who argue for
including aesthetic considerations among the proper objects of the po-
lice power. I
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing pro-
ject is or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is
broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as
well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the
48. Id at ., 234 A.2d at 120.
49. Id at . 234 A.2d at 122. See also Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., 45 So. 2d 681 (Fla.
1949); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Board, 339 N.E.2d 709, 716-21 (Mass.
1975).
50. See, e.g.. Modjeska Sign Studies, Inc. v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d 468, 373 N.E.2d 255, 402
N.Y.S.2d 359 (1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 809 (1978); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d 483, 373 N.E.2d 263, 402 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 808
(1978).
51. See The Truth About Beauty, supra note 40, at 128.
52. Id at 127. These jurisdictions include: Florida, Merrit v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861 (Fla.
1953); Hawaii, State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967); Kentucky,
Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964); Massachusetts, Joe Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor
Advertising Board, 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975); New Jersey, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 324
A.2d 113 (1974); New York, Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22
(1967).
53. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have
made determinations that take into account a wide variety of
values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who gov-
ern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital
should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the
Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.5 4
Prevention of further deterioration of a slum is a safety and health con-
sideration.55 Berman, however, does not stand for the proposition that
aesthetics, in the absence of other police power considerations, will sus-
tain an ordinance against a constitutional challenge.
Even more important is the fact that one generation after Berman,
the issue of beautification of our nation's cities is seen in terms of pre-
serving, not leveling, old buildings.56 The fact that the very method of
beautification of the community deemed appropriate in the 1950's is
now abhorrent to most communities in the United States, 57 vividly il-
lustrates the principle that aesthetic regulation of land use is a problem
that is not susceptible of precise standards and unchanging values.
What remains of the aesthetics holding in Berman after the Supreme
Court's decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York58 is only the proposition that beauty may be imposed by legisla-
tion.
IV. THREE RECENT CASES
A. Penn Central- Not Zoningfor Aesthetics
Advocates of historic preservation have long awaited a decision of
the United States Supreme Court upholding a municipal ordinance au-
thorizing the designation and preservation of landmark property. In
1978 the Supreme Court, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York, 59 upheld the application of New York City's landmarks or-
54. Id at 33 (citation omitted).
55. Id at 34-35. See also Citizens Defense Fund v. Gallagher, Cv-78-63-Bu (D. Mont., filed
3 Nov. 1978) (Findings of Fact,Conclusions of Law, and Order).
56. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See also note
166 infra and accompanying text.
57. The majority in Penn Central acknowledged "the widely shared belief that structures
with special historic, cultural, or architectural significance enhance the quality of life for all. Not
only do these buildings and their workmanship represent the lessons of the past and embody the
precious features of our heritage, they serve as examples of quality for today." 438 U.S. at 108.
58. Id at 104.
59. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8A, §§ 205-07 (1976). New York's Enabling statute
grants the authority to designate landmarks in New York City to the Landmarks Preservation
Commission. N.Y. GEM. MuN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977). The Commission, as required by
the Ordinance, is comprised of at least three architects, one historian, one city planner or land-
[Vol. 15:6 10
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dinance to prevent the construction of an office tower atop Grand Cen-
tral Terminal.6" While that case appears to be the decision validating
the regulation of designated landmark sites, it failed to decide the aes-
thetics issue.
Grand Central Terminal, designed by Reed and Stem, and War-
ren and Wetmore, was built in 1913. In 1967 it was designated a New
York City Landmark, which required the approval of the New York
City Landmarks Commission (Commission) of any plans for alteration
of its exterior.6 ' In 1968, Penn Central Transportation Company, the
owner of Grand Central, leased the development rights of the building
to UGP Properties, Inc., for construction of a fifty-five story tower atop
the Terminal. Immediately thereafter, Penn Central submitted two
plans to the Landmarks Commission (Breuer I and Breuer II Revised).
Breuer I proposed the construction of a fifty-five story tower while
Breuer II proposed a fifty-three story building involving even more al-
teration of the Terminal's facade than did the first.62 Both plans were
rejected by the Commission, which refused to issue either a certificate
of no effect or a certificate of appropriateness. 63 At this juncture, Penn
scape architect, one realtor, and at least one resident of each New York City borough. NEw
YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8A § 534 (1976).
60. See generally Marcus, The Grand Slam Grand Central Terminal Decision: A Euclidfor
Landmarks, Favorable Notice for TDR and A Resolution ofthe Regulatory/Taking Impasses, 7
ECOLOGY L.Q. 731 (1979); Note, From Zoning to Landmark Preservation: The Grand Central Ter-
minal Decision Signals A Shift In Land Use Regulation, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 39 (1979); Note,
Important Victory Won For Historic Preservation, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 385 (1979); Penn Central
Transportation Company v. City ofNew York. Landmark Preservation Eludes the "Taking" Clause,
14 NEW. ENG. L. REv. 317 (1978); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York:
Landmark Designation,- Legitimate Preservation or Unconstitutional Taking, 25 Loy. L. REV. 205
(1979); Historic Preservation by Means ofLandmark Designation. Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City [sic], 30 S.C.L. Rev. 825 (1979).
61. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8A, § 207-2.0(a) (1976) sets forth the procedure for
landmark designation. The Commission's written designation, subsequent to a public hearing, is
filed with the New York City Board of Estimate, which may approve a designation, or modify one
within 90 days. N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAW §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 1963) provides judicial review of
designations, to consider arbitrariness, caprice, or violation of law or procedure.
62. For discussion of both Breuer plans, see Huxtable, The Stakes are HighforAll in Grand
Central Battle, N.Y. Times, April 11, 1969, at 28, col. 4; Huxtable, Grand Central at the Cross-
roads, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1978, § 2, at 25, col. 4. It is important to note that the original plans of
1913 proposed a 20-story office tower over the Terminal. 438 U.S. at 104, 115 n.15.
63. A certificate of no effect would authorize alteration as having no detrimental effect on the
landmark site. New construction on a site requires a showing of no "effect not in harmony with
the external appearance" for a certificate; mere alteration requires proof the work will not destroy,
change or "affect any architectural feature." NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8A, § 205-5.0(1)
(1976).
Certificates of appropriateness are also available if the owner can show economic hardship
resulting from the designation. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE. ch. 8A, § 207-08.0 (1976).
Grand Central Terminal was, however, a partially tax exempt railway station, which class of prop-
erty, unlike certain other partially tax exempt sites, is not eligible for such a certificate. N.Y. REAL
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Central was entitled to judicial review,64 but did not seek it.65 Instead,
the Company brought suit against New York City, charging it with an
unconstitutional application of the landmarks ordinance to Grand
Central Terminal.
The trial court held that the application was an unconstitutional
taking.66 The Appellate Division reversed, finding that Penn Central
had failed to show a deprivation of all reasonable beneficial use of the
Terminal.67  The New York Court of Appeals affirmed that decision,
finding that the application of the ordinance was within the restrictions
imposed by a "pure due process" analysis of the Constitution.68 On
grounds different from those utilized by the lower courts, the United
PROP. TAX LAW § 489 (McKinney Supp. 1977). A certificate of appropriateness requires the
Landmarks Commission to consider the effect the plan will have upon the "protection, enhance-
ment, perpetuation and use" of the exterior portions with "a special character or special historical
or aesthetic interest or value." NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8A, §§ 207-6.0(c), (d).
64. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
65. 438 U.S. at 118. Approval of the Breuer plans involved aesthetic considerations alone.
Penn Central could only have argued economic hardship, a course not open to them owing to the
prohibition with respect to partially tax exempt railroad stations. See note 63 supra. On the
aesthetic considerations, see notes 86, 90-92 infra and accompanying text. Penn Central failed to
seek judicial review of the certificate denials. See 438 U.S. at 132-33.
Also, the transferrable and other development rights were available to the owner. Transfer-
rable development rights (TDRs) enable the owner to transfer the right to develop property desig-
nated as a landmark to adjacent lots in certain districts, with numerous provisions. These were
available to Penn Central in the Grand Central case. 438 U.S. at 114-15. On TDRs see generally
Costonis, 7he Chicago Plan.: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85
HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972); Costonis, Development Rights Transfers; .4n Exploratory Essay, 83
YALE L.J. 75 (1973); Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD.
372 (1971); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferrable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101
(1975); Note, Development Rights Transfers in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972).
Dictum in the Supreme Court's opinion makes a significant statment: "[S]ince appellants
have not sought approval for the -construction of a smaller structure, we do not know that appel-
lants will be denied any use of any portion of the air space above the terminal." 438 U.S. at 137.
The Court also reasoned that TDRs were available to Penn Central in at least eight nearby occa-
sions. The Court noted in dictum, however, that TDRs would not be just compensation in the
case of a taking. They are a mitigating factor in regulatory cases. Id In noting the possibility of a
20-story office tower, the Court referred to the original architectural plans for the Terminal. Id at
137 n.34. Also, a large percentage of single building landmarks are public and, therefore, immune
from the constitutional issue raised here, as the dissent indicates. Id. at 138 n.l. The majority,
however, disputed this proposition.
66. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23, 1975, at 16, col. 4,
rev'd, 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975), ai'd, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), a-f'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
67. 50 App. Div. 2d 265, _, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 29 (1975), a'd, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d
1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), aj'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Appellate Division reasoned that
the restriction was necessary and that the only deprivation Penn Central had suffered was that of
the mostproftable use of the property. 50 App. Div. 2d at -, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
68. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), a7f'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For
an excellent review of the three part analysis used, see Comment, Grand Central Terminal and the
New York Court ofAppeals: "Pure"Due Process, Reasonable Return, and Betterment Recovery, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 134 (1978).
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States Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, affirmed 69 the decision
of the New York Court of Appeals.
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Brennan, stated the
two issues presented: first, whether the use restrictions imposed on the
owners by the ordinance effected a taking for public use within the
meaning of the fifth amendment; and second, if so, whether just com-
pensation had been paid.7" The Court ruled that there was no taking in
violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments7' and, therefore,
found it unnecessary to rule on the second issue. The Court deter-
mined that the application of the ordinance was substantially related to
the welfare of the community, that it permitted reasonable beneficial
use of the landmark site, and that it afforded the owner an opportunity
to further enhance the property.7 2
Contrasting the opinion of the majority with that of the dissent
serves to illustrate the problem to which judicial attention must be ad-
dressed before satisfactory disposition of the aesthetics issue in regula-
tion of historic landmarks may be accomplished. The majority found
this ordinance to be valid within the limits of the police power because
it furthered "the general welfare."73 The dissent, on the other hand,
made no mention of the general welfare. Instead, it strictly confined
the police power, allowing it only to abate noxious or dangerous uses of
land.74 The majority relied heavily upon zoning ordinances for sup-
port, and likened the landmarks ordinance to zoning and regulation for
the general welfare even though it refused to equate the two. The dis-
sent, however, dealt quite differently with zoning, relying upon Penn-
69. 438 U.S. 104. The taking issue, while of major importance in the decision, is not the
focus of this comment. The Supreme Court held that Penn Central's right to develop the air space
above the building had not been taken in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments be-
cause Penn Central had not been deprived of all reasonable use of the parcel. Id at 135-37. The
dissent sharply criticized the majority's test which focused upon the severity of the impact. The
dissent neatly structured its argument, finding first, that what had been taken was "property,"
second, that there had been a taking under the test used in United States v. General Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945), and third, that a full and perfect equivalent had not been paid. 438
U.S. at 142-50 (Rehnquist, dissenting). For discussions of that matter, see generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-2 to 9-4 (1978); Berger, A Policy Analysis ofthe Taking
Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 165 (1974); Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Contro-
versies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1976); Costonis, "Fair" Compensa-
tion and the Accomodation Power: 4ntidotesfor the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
70. 438 U.S. at 122.
71. Id at 138.
72. Id at 129.
73. Id at 138.
74. ld at 143-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon7" for the proposition that noninjurious uses
may be prohibited without effecting a taking if the prohibition applies
to a broad section of land and thereby distributes the benefit and cost
of the prohibition. In essence, then, the dissent in Penn Central se-
verely limited the constitutionality of land use regulation. This was
accomplished by making zoning-generally accepted as a legitimate
exercise of the police power-an exception to the prohibition against
taking without just compensation. Such taking is permitted because of
the mutual advantage and burden for those affected by it.
A major difficulty in Penn Central is the precise nature of the legis-
lation at issue. As stated earlier, the Supreme Court was divided on the
question of whether the landmarks ordinance was similar to zoning or
whether it dealt with zoning at all. The majority's statement that the
ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power does little to shed light
on the appropriate standard for measuring the reasonableness of such
ordinances. What then is that standard? The New York Court of Ap-
peals stated that Penn Central was "not a zoning case. In many ways,
the restrictions imposed on the use of the property are similar to zoning
restrictions, but the purposes are different, and in determining whether
regulation is reasonable, the purposes behind the regulation assume
considerable significance."76 Yet, the New York Court of Appeals did
not say what types of legislation the ordinance is.
The United States Supreme Court distinguished this type of ordi-
nance from a zoning ordinance by a subtlety only, doing so in response
to Penn Central's argument that New York City's regulation of isolated
landmarks differs from zoning or historic district regulation." The
Court simply relied on zoning cases, and likened this one to a zoning
case78 but preserved a distinction.
The dissent provided a full discussion of zoning, finding that this
case involved zoning "only in the most superficial sense of the word."79
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the dissent, criticized the majority's
reasoning. He rejected the majority suggestion that because traditional
zoning results in some limitation of property use then New York's
landmark preservation ordinance should be upheld to represent the ul-
75. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
76. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 329, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 917 (1977), afd, 438 U.S.
104 (1978). See id at 136 n.2.
77. 438 U.S. at 125.
78. Id at 125-28, 132, 135 n.32.
79. Id at 139-41.
[Vol. 15:610
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timate in treating different things as alike. He also warned that the
rubric of zoning is insufficient to avoid the limits of the fifth amend-
ment.80
To satisfy the dissent, the constitutionality of the ordinance should
have been tested by stricter scrutiny of the terms "property," "taken,"
and "just compensation.""1 Believing that the majority failed to meet
its obligation to analyze fully the eminent domain cases decided by the
Court, 2 the dissent examined takings by contrast to the "nuisance ex-
ception to the taking guarantee." 3 The test the dissent applied was
whether the forbidden use would endanger the safety, health, or wel-
'fare of others.84 The New York City ordinance does indeed fail this
test.
Appellees are not prohibiting a nuisance. The record is clear
that the proposed addition to the Grand Central Terminal
would be in full compliance with zoning, height limitations,
and other health and safety requirements. Instead, appellees
are seeking to preserve what they believe to be an outstanding
example of beaux arts architecture. Penn Central is prevented
from further developing its property basically because it did
too good ofa job in designing and building it. The City of New
York, because of its unadorned admiration for the design, has
decided that the owners of the building must preserve it un-
changed for the benefit of sightseeing New Yorkers and tour-
ists.85
1. Aesthetics and the Designation
The point raised in the dissenting opinion that the building is "too
good" deserves serious consideration, particularly in light of the oppo-
sition that all landmarks ordinances inevitably face from an owner of
commercial property.
The New York City ordinance, particularly as it affected Grand
Central Terminal upon its designation as a landmark, gives a major
role to aesthetic considerations. At least arguably, it goes beyond the
safe limits of the earlier cases upholding challenges to preservation of
beautiful, historic structures.86 Each court in the Penn Central case
80. Id at 140.
81. Id at 142.
82. Id at 142 nA.
83. Id at 145.
84. Id.
85. Id at 145-46 (emphasis added).
86. NEW YORK, N.Y., MUN. CODE, ch. 8A, § 207-2.0 provides that the Landmarks Commis-
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paid more than lip service to the aesthetic importance of the building.
The Appellate Division labeled Grand Central Terminal a "splendid
edifice and a major part of the cultural and architectural heritage of
New York City."87 The Court of Appeals deferred to the determina-
tion of the Appellate Division that the significance of the architectural
design was great and that it was an excellent example of comprehensive
urban design.8 The United States Supreme Court described Grand
Central Terminal as one of the most renowned buildings in New York,
a magnificent example of French Beaux Arts architecture.8 9
The courts were not the only bodies impressed by the Terminal's
architecture. The Landmarks Commission relied upon the building's
aesthetic qualities in making the designation, 90 and also explained that
the rejection of Breuer II Revised was for aesthetic reasons. The Com-
mission stated that although it had no rule against additions to desig-
nated buildings, the approval of such additions was dependent upon
whether the proposed addition is consistent with the original architec-
ture of the structure. The Landmarks Commission did recognize that
suggested changes in the Terminal's entrances would improve pedes-
trian access and be an acceptable means of both perpetuating the use of
the building and protecting its exterior.9 The Commission was unwill-
ing, however, to accept a modification of the Terminal that it deemed
inconsistent with the architecture of the existing structure.
[T]o balance a 55-story office tower above a flamboyant
Beaux-Arts facade seems nothing more than an aesthetic joke.
Quite simply, the tower would overwhelm the Terminal by its
sheer mass. The "addition" would be four times as high as
the existing structure and would reduce the Landmark itself
to the status of a curiosity.92
The Commission also found that landmarks cannot be divorced from
dramatic settings, saying that alterations must "protect, enhance and
sion has the power to designate landmarks in order to effectuate the purpose of the law, set out at
§ 205-1.0, where the ordinance states that many buildings have "special character or a special
historical or aesthetic interest or value." Id at § 205-1.0(a) and (b).
87. 50 App. Div. 2d at _, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
88. 42 N.Y.2d at 328, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
89. 438 U.S. at 115.
90. See note 161 infra and accompanying text.
91. 50 App. Div. 2d at _, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 31.
92. 438 U.S. at 117-18 (quoting the Record at 2251) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court
also cited the Commission's response to Breuer II Revised: "To protect a landmark, one does not
tear it down. To perpetuate its architectural features, one does not strip them off." Id at 117
(quoting the Record at 2255).
[Vol. 15:610
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perpetuate the original design rather than overwhelm it."93
The "aesthetic joke" foreseen by the Commission was vigorously
challenged by Justice Lupiano's dissent in the Appellate Division. He
noted that Marcel Breuer & Associates is a distinguished, award-win-
ning architectural firm which designed the lauded Whitney Museum in
New York City, the Department of Housing and Urban Develoment
Headquarters Building in Washington, D.C., and other famous edi-
fices.94 Justice Lupiano also noted that the proposed tower was not
inconsistent with the original plans for the twenty-story office tower,
the pillars for which are part of the Terminal as it now stands. The
dissent was also aware that the removal of certain shops and outdoor
advertisements on Forty-Second Street and the creation of a pedestrian
arcade by the plan would considerably enhance the exterior of the Ter-
minal by quieting and dignifying its base. Thus, the dissent concluded
that the addition of an office tower above the Terminal would not re-
sult in the aesthetic joke foreseen by the Landmarks Commission.
2. Two Inconsistent Styles: An Aesthetic Joke?
The historic distaste in American jurisprudence for any exercise of
the police power based purely on aesthetic considerations is founded
upon reasons uniquely underscored by the Grand Central Terminal
case. To parallel the phrase that one man's meat is another man's
poison, Beaux Arts architecture is neither better nor worse than Marcel
Breuer's modem designs.
More sensitive, of course, though much more easily disposed of by
the various courts in the Penn Central case by deference to the decision
of the Landmarks Commission,95 is the question of intolerable incon-
93. Id at 118.
94. That designs by Marcel Breuer are themselves "landmarks" is one of the many ironies of
the Penn Central decision. Marcel Breuer, whose brilliant career began in Das Staattiche Bauhaus
formed by Walter Gropius in 1919, designed furniture in his early career. His famous tubular
steel armchair of 1925 can be seen in the Museum of Modern Art to which it was donated by
Herbert Bayer. In 1937 Breuerjoined the Harvard faculty and in 1941 formed his own architec-
tural firm. His accomplishments, to name only a few, include: House II, New Canaan, Connecti-
cut, 1951; Lecture Hall, New York University, Bronx, New York, 1961; St. John's Abbey and
University, Collegeville, Minnesota, (together with Hamilton Smith), 1953-63; UNESCO Build-
ing, Paris, (together with Bernard Zehrfuss and Pier Luigi Nervi), 1958; Whitney Museum of
American Art, New York, 1966.
95. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8A, § 207-6.0(b)(2) lists those factors governing
issuance of a Certificate of Appropriateness. "In appraising such effects and relationship [of the
proposed to the existing portions of the building], the commission shall consider, in addition to
any other pertinent matters, the factors of aesthetic, historical and architectural values and signifi-
cance, architectural style, design, arrangement, texture, material and color." Id. Such language,
particularly when used to deny a property owner the right to add the design of an esteemed
18
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sistency between the two styles of architecture. The protection of the
already built style from the admixture, or superimposition, of another
was never questioned as a purely aesthetic exercise of the police power.
Only in its complaint to the New York District Court did Penn Central
directly address the valid aesthetics issue.
The landmark character of the terminal is highly debatable
and at best doubtful. The aesthetic quality of the south
facade is obscured by its engulfment among narrow streets
and high-rise buildings. It is hardly seen at all except for a
short distance to the south on Park Avenue.... Moreover,
the terminal is set against the backdrop of the harsh and con-
trasting lines of the Pan-Am building which appears to hang
over the terminal and dwarf it.96
As subsequent cases have begun to reveal,97 land use regulation on
aesthetic grounds may become the primary issue in cases dealing with
landmark preservation laws. Courts may be forced to decide which
style is more beautiful, the old or the new, and whether any new style is
as beautiful as the old. Aside from the fact that such determinations
are almost impossible for any court to make, decisions of this sort
should never come before public tribunals. Indeed, if landmark ordi-
nances were "improved""8 so as to foreclose post-designation confron-
tations on purely aesthetic grounds, these disputes would not find their
way into the courts.
3. The Issue Is Undecided
In upholding the decision of the Appellate Division, the Court of
Appeals issued dictum of key significance in explaining some of the
irregularities of this case:
In times of easy affluence, preservation of historic
landmarks through the use of the eminent domain power
might be desirable, or even required. But when a less expen-
sive alternative is available, especially when a city is in
financial distress, it should not be forced to choose between
witnessing the demolition of its glorious past and mortgaging
its hopes for the future.... The statute needs improvement.
modem architect, might well be challenged as arbitrary. Measured by any set of standards used in
evaluating the constitutionality of zoning laws, such factors might be found disproportionately
aesthetic and open to many different reasonable interpretations.
96. Appellant's Complaint at para. 20.
97. See notes 110-29 infra and accompanying text.
98. See note 99 infra.
99. 42 N.Y.2d at 337, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
[Vol. 15:610
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The Court of Appeals thus excused the inadequacies of the ordinance
because of the inability of the City of New York to pay just compensa-
tion.
The principal deficiency in the Penn Central case can be found in
the Supreme Court's unspoken utilization of aesthetic considerations.
The undercurrent of the Court's rationale indicates that aesthetics can
play a major role in landmark designation and regulation. Yet, the
Court failed to pronounce that aesthetics were valid in such a role. The
Court accounted for its acquiescence by stating:
[Tihe related argument that the decision to designate a struc-
ture as a landmark "is inevitably arbitrary or at least subjec-
tive because it is basically a matter of taste," . . . has a
particularly hollow ring in this case. For appellants not only
did not seek judicial review of either the designation or of the
denials of the certificates of appropriateness and of no exte-
rior effect, but do not even now suggest that the Commission's
decisions concerning the Terminal were in any sense arbitrary
or unprincipled. But, in any event, a landmark owner has a
right to judicial review of any Commission decision, and,
quite simply, there is no basis whatsoever for a conclusion
that courts will have any greater difficulty identifying arbi-
trary or discriminatory action in the context of landmark reg-
ulation than in the context of classic zoning or indeed in any
other contextl °°
The facts in the case reveal that the Terminal was designated a
landmark site on August 2, 1967, after the Commission found that the
architecture and other features had a special character, historical and
aesthetic interest, and value as part of the development, heritage, and
culture of New York City. The Commission also found that Grand
Central Terminal is a magnificent example of French Beaux Arts archi-
tecture;' 0 ' one of the great buildings of America, because it combined
the practicalities of solving a difficult problem with the artistic splendor
of its architecture and that as an American railroad station it is
unique.'0 2 In its report, the Commission stated that Grand Central
100. 438 U.S. at 132-33 (footnote and citation omitted).
101. See notes 85 and 92 supra and accompanying text. See also P. GOLDBERGER, THE CITY
OBSERVED: NEW YORK (1979) where the author states that Warren & Wetmore, the distinguished
Beaux-Arts firm, was brought in to add "a touch of class to the project," Id at 124, which Reed &
Stem had designed. The facade is largely the work of Whitney Warren. The sculpture group at
the center of the facade is the work of sculptor Jules Coutan. Id at 124-25.
102. 50 App. Div. 2d at _, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 23, 25. It is extremely important to note that Penn
Station, which imitated the Baths of Caracalla in Rome, was destroyed in the 1960's. It is gener-
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Terminal evokes a special spirit and that its style "represents the best of
the French Beaux Arts." Clearly, these are conclusions of an aesthetic
character. Aesthetic considerations and conclusions, therefore, pre-
vented the development rights from being utilized to their fullest, and
most beneficial, extent.
Had Penn Central argued that the landmarks ordinance was, in
the designation phase and in the prohibition of an addition phase, reg-
ulation of land use solely on aesthetic grounds rather than yield on the
point that aesthetics and history are valid reasons for land use regula-
tion, 0 3 the issue would have received more attention and perhaps have
been decided. Furthermore, the Court avoided the zoning for aesthet-
ics problem by merely likening the ordinance to zoning but failing to
equate the two."° Only in its complaint did Penn Central assert that
the Commission's standards were inadequate, and that regulations for
the "aesthetic good" are unconstitutional. 105 Before the Supreme
Court, however, Penn Central "ma[de] no assertion that the preserva-
tion of a building of historical or aesthetic importance is not an appro-
priate objective of governmental action in pursuit of the public
welfare." 106
The city did not fail to avail itself of Penn Central's concession on
the appropriateness of such legislation.0 7 Citing cases wherein consti-
tutional regulations of land use to protect the "quality of life" were
held to include legislation "for aesthetic and other similar purposes,"
the city contended that the preservation of landmarks is "directly re-
lated to the economic and cultural vitality of the City."' 08 Yet, careful
examination of that accepted view reveals that it is structured upon
cases dealing with neighborhoods that are dependent upon tourist
trade. Retention of the economic vitality of these areas can only be
achieved through operation of a landmarks ordinance which preserves
their quaintness and charm. 109 Single building landmarks present very
ally acknowledged to have been the more beautiful of the two major railroad stations in New
York City. The Appellate Division noted, also, that Congress has declared its policy to be preser-
vation of historic passenger railroad terminals such as Grand Central in the Amtrak Improvement
Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. § 1653 (Supp. 1979). 50 App. Div. 2d at _ 377 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
103. 438 U.S. at 147 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. See notes 77-78 supra.
105. Appellant's Complaint at para. 38.
106. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 11. Both the majority and the dissent note this.
438 U.S. at 129, 132, 147 n.10.
107. Appellee's Brief at 20. (citing Appellant's Brief at 12, 22-23).
108. Id at 21-23.
109. See, e.g., NEw ORLEANS, LA., VIEux CARRE ORDINANCE No. 14,538 CCS (1937) which
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different issues.
B. The City of Paris: Not a Landmark
A case similar to Penn Central is currently working its way
through the California courts. Foundation For San Francisco's Archi-
tectural Heritage v. City and County of San Francisco "' involves a dis-
pute over the destruction of the four-story City of Paris Building in San
Francisco and its replacement with a modem, larger store."'
In 1970, Neiman-Marcus purchased the City of Paris Building on
San Francisco's Union Square." 2  The building's most important ar-
chitectural features are an interior rotunda lined with columns, and a
stained glass dome above the rotunda." 3 From 1967 to 1972 the build-
ing remained vacant, and it closed again in 1974. Today, the building
is vacant as it has been for most of the time since 1974.1 4 Neiman-
Marcus claims that its plan was to refurbish the structure and use it for
a department store, but that engineering analyses revealed structural
weaknesses and prohibitive renovation costs." 5  Neiman-Marcus,
was upheld as valid regulation in New Orleans v. Impasto, 198 La. 206, 3 So. 2d 559 (1941). See
also New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953); New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La.
852,5 So. 2d 129 (1941); Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923). In Maher v. New
Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), the preservation of the quaintness of historic buildings and
districts was held to be important for the protection of the commercial value of property, to pro-
mote tourism, to prevent depreciation of property values in general, or a combination of such
reasons.
110. 1 Civil 48599 (Cal. App.).
I 11. The new structure is designed by the famous architects Philip Johnson and John Burgee.
Philip Johnson, who is perhaps most famous for the Glass House he designed, in New Canaan,
Connecticut, and the more recent Rothko Chapel in Houston, Texas, won the American Institute
of Architecture's gold medal in 1977. He also designed the courtyard of the Museum of Modem
Art in New York City, the Munson-Williams-Proctor Institute in Utica, New York, the New York
State Theater at Lincoln Center in New York City, and the Seagram Building in New York City
together with Mies van der Rohe. John Burgee has received four professional honors and
designed numerous major structures. See Brief for Respondent (Neiman Marcus, Real Party in
Interest) at 8.
112. The City of Paris Building, constructed in 1896 as the Spring Valley Water Company
Building, was renamed shortly thereafter. Its original designer was Clinton Day. See note 127
infra on the building's history.
113. In 1974, when Neiman-Marcus' plans to destroy the building were first published, Citi-
zens To Save The City of Paris was formed and it petitioned the City of San Francisco to desig-
nate the building a landmark. That request was denied. In 1975, however, the State of California
designated the building a State Landmark, and ten days later it was registered on the National
Register of Historic Places. See Appellants' Opening Brief (Foundation for San Francisco's Ar-
chitectural Heritage) at 6-7, 56 n.8; Brief for Respondent at 19-20.
114. Brief for Respondent at 5.
115. A major problem with renovation of the existing structure is its lack of even sufficient
seismic bracing to meet the requirements of the City's Building Code. Also, and even more obvi-
ous, are the problems of sufficient floor space, escalators and elevators, and climate control facili-
ties for a major department store. Id at 5-6.
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therefore, proposed that the building and a neighboring structure be
destroyed and replaced by a new, larger building which would retain
the rotunda and the dome by incorporating them into the new build-
ing. 116
The dispute is almost exclusively over aesthetics, and, as in Penn
Central, involves precisely the same sort of public furor over new de-
signs being comingled with old designs. Neiman-Marcus claims that
"aesthetically, the new building will be the equal of those it re-
places.""' 7 The case is currently on appeal in the California Court of
Appeal, where the stated issues are: the inadequacy of the environmen-
tal impact report; the insufficiency of the Superior Court's findings; and
whether the destruction of the building is a violation of the Master Plan
of the City of San Francisco.'18
The City of Paris Building is not a San Francisco Landmark.
Only that designation would trigger the prohibitions of the city ordi-
nance with respect to destruction and alteration of a building." l9 The
registration of the building on the state and federal landmark lists is
accompanied by no prohibitions on alteration or demolition. 20  The
preservationists, however, seek a decision holding the city's approval of
the project to be a violation of San Francisco's Master Plan. The peti-
tioners characterize this plan as "an enforceable blueprint for the phys-
ical development of the city."'' The defendants explain it as a
document of inconsistent suggestions, but certainly not a binding ordi-
116. Id at 7-8. In 1975 the City's planning department determined that an environmental
impact report would be necessary. Neiman-Marcus hired a private consultant to prepare the re-
port. The City, before granting approval of the project after the final report was submitted, re-
quired Neiman-Marcus to modify the design "in order better to conform to various aesthetic
goals." Id at 10. These included architectural changes as well as color alterations. Appellants'
Opening Brief at 11. When the Neiman-Marcus plan was approved, this lawsuit was filed seeking
administrative mandamus which the Superior Court denied. Foundation for San Francisco's Ar-
chitectural Heritage v. City and County of San Francisco, 749-536 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 26, 1979).
117. Brief for Respondent at 8.
118. The sufficiency of the environmental impact report is being challenged by the preserva-
tionists for faulty description and concealment of alternatives, and lack of objective feasibility
determinations. Brief for Petitioners at 20-31. The Superior Court made each of its opinions
known in two lines. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 3. The Master Plan of San Francisco is
authorized by SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. CHARTER, Art. III, ch. 5, § 3.524.
119. See Brief for Respondent at 18-21. The ordinance is SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE,
ch. II, art. 10, (1978).
120. Brief for Respondent at 21-23. On the effect of registration of a building on the National
Register of Historic Places, see note 5 supra. California's preservation legislation, CAL. Pun. RES,
CODE §§ 5020-33 (West, 1979), like the federal registration, imposes no restrictions on the owner's
use of the property.
121. Appellants' Opening Brief at 53.
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nance. 1
22
The true issue in the case is the aesthetic, not the historic, signifi-
cance of the City of Paris Building, particularly its interior which Nei-
man-Marcus plans to preserve. The preservationists argue that the
architects of the proposal regard the exterior as having no architectural
significance, but see the interior as being aesthetically valuable.
1 23
Faulting Johnson's and Burgee's plan as incorporating the rotunda and
dome as mere showpieces in the new building, they further criticized
the project, stating that "it is not the interested project architects who
should determine what is or is not architecturally significant about the
building .... In the new design, the rotunda and dome comprise a
sterile museum piece set off in the glass-enclosed comer of a modem,
neolithic box."' 24  In response, Neiman-Marcus argues that the
preservationists' petition "is an effort to impose upon the entire City the
aesthetic values of a dedicated few who have announced their intention
to use every procedural device available to halt the project, whatever
the merits."' 25 The retort from the petitioners is that "Neiman-Marcus
is seeking to impress its aesthetic values on the resisting people of the
city.' 126
The different aesthetic values are, simply, the old style and com-
pleteness of the City of Paris Building as it now stands on the one hand,
and, on the other, the ultra-modern style of the proposed building pre-
serving the dome and rotunda in a new setting. The new building, in-
corporating the dome and rotunda, is architecturally eclectic. As
Neiman-Marcus argues, however, the City of Paris Building, even as it
stands, is comprised of several phases of design and construction, and is
the work of several architects. 127 Neiman-Marcus further asserts that
"The new building will retain the rotunda and glass dome, which were
the unique contribution of Blakewell and Brown to the design of the
building.... Aesthetically, the new building will be the equal of those
122. Brief for Respondent at 24-28.
123. Appellants' Opening Brief at 57.
124. Id
125. Brief for Respondent at 4.
126. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2.
127. The building was erected in 1896 according to the design of Clinton Day, and rebuilt
from 1906-1909 after the fire. The dome and rotunda were designed after the fire by John
Blakewell and Arthur Brown, Jr., the architects of San Francisco's City Hall and Veterans War
Memorial Building. The exterior of the building is the work of "architects of no particular distinc-
tion." Brief for Respondent at 5. The building's design is post-fire on the lower two stories and
Clinton Day's design on the upper two. Id See also M. CORBETr, SPLENDID SURVIVORS 127
(1979).
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it replaces. It has been designed by two of this country's most promi-
nent architects."1 2 Hence, the questions before the court are, funda-
mentally, whether the style of the whole City of Paris Building, as it
appears now, must be preserved and whether a new building of modern
design, incorporating the most significant aesthetic features of the
building, but in a different setting, should not be built in its place. Per-
haps the best example of how far from the litigation issues the public
furor lies, but of how much a matter of aesthetics the dispute is, lies in
the words of an architectural guidebook author.
Apart from its great interior space with its superbly detailed
columns and stained glass dome, the real importance of the
building is in its relationship to Union Square, to Geary and
Stockton streets, and to the architecture of the retail district
... [T]he stylistic references of its details, and the colors
and textures of its materials all relate to the city around it.
The buildings around the City of Paris, all of which were built
later, relate to each other not so much out of a conscious effort
to do so, but rather out of a shared attitude toward design and
toward the urban function of a building on a street. The
building is presently threatened by a Philip Johnson design
for a new Neiman Marcus store which fails to understand the
urban importance of the existing building. 129
The aesthetic price 30 society must pay for preventing the altera-
tion of the City of Paris building is high. Most fundamentally, the new
building is, arguably, at least as "beautiful" an edifice as the current
building and, very possibly, more beautiful. Indeed, the aesthetic in-
tegrity of the new building may be said to be greater than the style of
the current one because Johnson and Burgee are true artists of a style
of the post-war twentieth century, whose designs are invariably consid-
ered to be original, and beautiful. 13 They are masterpieces in the lit-
eral sense of the word.
On a less obvious plane, preventing the alteration of the City of
Paris Building stunts a certain and much needed development in archi-
128. Brief for Respondent at 8.
129. M. CORBETT, SPLENDID SURVIVORS 127 (1979).
130. Neiman-Marcus argues the economic price to San Francisco as being quite high, particu-
larly in terms of lost revenue from sales tax on the greater volume of goods which can be sold
from the larger store, and from the loss of income from the greater number of employees needed
to staff the larger store. See Brief for Respondent at 8-9.
131. Just as in Penn Central, there is great irony in the fact that the works of the modem
architect are themselves, at least arguably, landmark architecture.
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tecture, that is, the emergence of an eclectic style of contemporary ar-
chitecture incorporating into new buildings the prized and essential
features of the older buildings13 2 which the new buildings replace or
abut. Practicalities dictate that although many buildings in the United
States were built with high quality workmanship and have architec-
tural charm if not great beauty, all of these buildings cannot and will
not be preserved by either legislation or litigation. It is essential, there-
fore, that the scheme of architectural preservation in this country pro-
mote voluntary preservation13 3 and allow for high quality, aesthetically
valuable integration of the new with the old. This is particularly true in
urban centers where development of land is the only method of gener-
ating sufficient revenues to prevent blight.
134
In the eyes of some beholders, additions to old buildings and struc-
tures adjacent to them should be disguised completely so as to keep
entirely the design, scale, and materials of the old building. This type
of restriction is most easily understood in historic neighborhoods, com-
prised of blocks of buildings that are architecturally identical. In the
case of a single building, however, the decision of the owner may well
become total demolition because the only apparent alternative is abso-
lute preservation. That is, in the absence of an available compromise,
the destruction of many beautiful buildings, unprotected by strict ordi-
nances, will be more likely than in a legal setting which offers attractive
alternatives.
Among the needed architectural prototypes is just such a building
as the Johnson-Burgee design proposed for alteration of the City of
132. If the addition of a modem structure is extremely offensive on the site of a landmark, it
should be equally offensive when next door, particularly in a crowded urban center where build-
ings usually meet. The argument of a preservationist that a modem super-structure on a
landmark base, or around a landmark dome and rotunda, does not suit the older portion of the
building, aesthetically, may easily be taken to absurd limits in light of the aesthetic eclecticism
contained in an average city block. This author is of the opinion that the architectural beauty of
many of our nation's cities results, in large part, from this very factor: the variation in scales,
styles, materials, and eras.
133. See notes 161-64 infra and accompanying text.
134. See generally Zoning ForAesthetics Substantially Reducing Property Values, Comment, 27
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 303 (1970) on the practical economic effects of land use restrictions based
on aesthetics. During the late publication stages of this article, the California Court of Appeal
determined that Neiman-Marcus should be permitted to tear down the City of Paris Building.
The court reached its decision because "San Francisco planning officials had complied with the
procedural and substantive requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act." Los An-
geles Daily Journal, June 17, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
The court's decision focused upon the adequacy of the Environmental Quality Report stating
that "there was ample opportunity for the input and comment of all persons interested." Id. The
court further noted that sufficient consideration had been given to the viability of alternatives to
the proposed destruction of the City of Paris Building. .d. at 23.
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Paris Building. The jewel-box effect of the new and clean design em-
bracing the ornate features of the old City of Paris Building is precisely
the sort of aesthetic eclecticism which may save the best, and the major
part, of our architectural past. Aesthetically, the proposal may even be
said to be brilliant in its preservation of the gems of the past within an
arguably brighter, stylistically noncompeting structure and in its subtle
harmony between the two styles. If these prototypes emerge, they, like
many renovation projects such as the Cannery in San Francisco, may
hasten the arrival at a compromise between competing tastes with re-
spect to architectural style.
C. Charleston Center. The Environmental Issue
In Charleston, South Carolina, citizens opposing the construction
of a twelve-story hotel and convention center in the city's historic dis-
trict have recently filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against
federal officials and the Mayor of Charleston. 135 The controversy
stems in part from the absence of harmony between the arrhitectural
style and scale of the proposed modern Charleston Center and the ar-
chitectural character of historic Charleston. The primary issue, how-
ever, involves the project's environmental effects on the historic part of
Charleston. 136
Charleston has applied for a federal grant for the development of
a large hotel, convention center, commercial complex, and parking ga-
rage in the historic section of the city.137 The plaintiffs have sued to
prevent the release of the federal funds to Charleston until the city fully
complies 138 with the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),139 the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),14 ° and the Housing Com-
135. The plaintiffs are the National Center for Preservation Law, the Preservation Society of
Charleston, the Charlestown Neighborhood Association, and the Harleston Village Association.
The defendants are the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the
Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Administrator of the Economic Development administra-
tion, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and the
Mayor of Charleston. National Center For Preservation Law v. Landrieu, Complaint, 80-0514
(D.D.C., filed Feb. 25, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Complaint].
136. The plaintiffs allege a wide variety of adverse effects upon their neighborhood. See notes
148-50 infra and accompanying text.
137. The historic section of Charleston is listed on the National Register of Historic Places,
Complaint at 2.
138. Id at 2-3. The plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment to the effect that the defend-
ants have not fulfilled the requirements of the statutes. Id at 2.
139. 16 U.S.C. § 470-470m (1976). See also note 5 supra.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976).
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munity Development Act (HCDA).' 4 '
The overlap between NEPA and the NHPA is of key importance
in this case, and is likely to increase in significance with the passage of
time. Section 101 of NEPA is a broad statement that it is the continu-
ing responsibility of the federal government
to use all practicable means .. to improve and coordinate
Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources...
(2) to assure for all Americans safe, healthful, produc-
tive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surround-
ings;
... [and to]
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural as-
pects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever
possible, an environment which supports diversity and
variety of individual choice.
14 2
Section 102 of NEPA requires that all federal agencies cooperate in this
responsibility, and that an environmental impact statement be prepared
for any "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment."' 4 The environmental impact statement must
outline alternative plans for any adverse environmental effects it identi-
fies.' The plaintiffs in the Charleston Center case allege that the fed-
eral grant to finance the Charleston Center is such major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, 45 and
that alternatives to the plan were not adequately considered.
As is NEPA, the NHPA is a policy statement containing general
directives with which federal agencies must comply. The NHPA re-
quires the head of any federal agency having "jurisdiction" over a pro-
posed federally assisted project to take into account the effect that that
project will have on any district, site, building, structure, or object
listed on the National Register of Historic Places. 146 The plaintiffs in
the Charleston Center case complain of the failure of the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development and the Administrator for Economic
Development "to conduct any studies or compile the information nec-
essary for adequate consideration of modifications or alterations of the
proposed project that could avoid, mitigate or minimize any adverse
141. Id § 1321.
142. Id § 4331(b) (1976).
143. Id § 4332(2)(c) (1976).
144. Id § 4332(2)(E) (1976).
145. Complaint at 13.
146. 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1976).
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effects"' 4 7 on the aesthetic area.
Among the plaintiffs' objections to construction of the Charleston
Center is the aesthetic obtrusion they believe it to be. They allege that
the Center, "because of its size and architectural design," will have a
"serious and negative impact on the visual and aesthetic character" of
the historic district of Charleston. 4 8 The plaintiffs also complain that
the Center will "affect the visual and aesthetic character of the Dis-
trict."'149 For purposes of this comment, it is important to note that the
Charleston Center plaintiffs are careful to allege the aesthetic offense as
one among many others, including the destruction of historic property
by the project, and the additional traffic and noise the Center will gen-
erate. 5
0
The Charleston Center case is readily distinguishable from the
Grand Central Terminal and City of Paris cases. First, the dispute in
Charleston involves the historic and architectural charm of an entire
district as opposed to that of a single building in a large urban center.
Second, the government is the developer in the planning, financing,
and operating phases. Third, and most important here, the aesthetics
issue does not turn onprivate taste by rather on what taste the govern-
ment exhibits in fostering the project. Hence, the importance of
NEPA.
Assuming the federal financing to be "major federal action"
within the meaning of NEPA,' 51 the question of the adequacy of the
study of the aesthetic effects on an historic community rises to the fore.
The few courts which have faced this issue of NEPA and aesthetic in-
quiries have, not surprisingly, avoided discussing aesthetic details. For
example, the District of Columbia Circuit has held that in relation to
NEPA's application to aesthetic matters, the intent of Congress was
that a "hard look" or "substantial inquiry" was not necessary.'5 2 A
147. Complaint at 16. The plaintiffs further allege that the Secretary of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development has purported to delegate improperly his authority under the
NHPA, to the City of Charleston, pursuant to 24 C.F.R. Part 58, and that the Administrator for
Economic Development has done the same. Complaint at 16.
The plaintiffs also complain of the alleged failure of the Advisory Council on Historic Preser-
vation to comply with its own regulations in reviewing the Charleston Center project. Id at 18.
148. Id at 7-8. The hotel is to be 12 stories tall, amidst the three story buildings in the district.
The project would occupy almost an entire block in width. Id at 8.
149. Id
150. Id at 29-30.
151. See notes 140-45 supra and accompanying text. But see Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S.
390 (1976) (mere contemplation of action is not major federal action).
152. See Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. United States Post Office,
487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir 1973), where the court stated:
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federal district court, deciding City of New Haven v. Chandler,153 how-
ever, has held that the impossibility of quantifying aesthetic values
means "at most, that a finding as to the role of aesthetics need not be
supported by statistical evidence." '154 In Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Commission,15 the Second Circuit was
faced with the argument that the Federal Power Commission had erro-
neously concluded that a storage project of Consolidated Edison Com-
pany, proposed for construction at Storm King Mountain near
Cornwall, New York, constituted "no real impairment of the environ-
mental and scenic aspects" of the area.'56 In ruling that the Commis-
sion's conclusions as to the aesthetic effects of the project were
supported by substantial evidence, the court carefully reviewed the evi-
dence on aesthetics. Judge Hays, writing for the majority, said, "This is
clearly a policy determination which, whatever may be our personal
views, we do not have the power to impose on the Commission."' 157
It is understandable, in light of previous discussions, that courts
perceive aesthetics under NEPA to be a hot potato, as evidenced by
their deferral to the findings and conclusions on aesthetics made by
federal agencies with no expertise in the area.'58 In historic preserva-
tion matters such as the Charleston Center case, however, there is a
federal body to which the courts can easily look for findings based on
knowledge of architectural history. The Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation is a federal body which may provide advice to Congress
That some, or perhaps all, environmental impacts have an esthetic facet, does not mean
that all adverse esthetic impacts affect environment. That is neither good logic nor good
law. Some questions of esthetics do not seem to lend thenselves to the detailed analysis
required under NEPA .... Like psychological factors, they "are not readily translatable
into concrete measuring rods .... The difficulty in defining what is beautiful cannot
stand in the way of expressions of community choice through zoning regulation.... But
the difficulties have a bearing on the intention of Congress, and whether it contemplated,
for example, a requirement of a detailed "environmental impact statement," and con-
comitant investigation, because of the possibility that each new Federal construction
would be ugly to some, or even most, beholders on such issues as: Is this proposed
building beautiful? Or, what is the esthetic effect of placing the "controversial" Picasso
statute [sic] in front of the Civic Center building in Chicago? These types of problems
lead us to conclude that a "substantial inquiry" or "hard look" was not contemplated, as
a matter of reasonable construction of NEPA, where the claim of NEPA application is
focused on alleged esthetic impact and the matters at hand pertain essentially to issues of
individual and potentially diverse tastes.
Id at 1038-39 (citations omitted).
153. 446 F. Supp. 925 (D. Conn. 1978).
154. Id at 930.
155. 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
156. 453 F.2d at 473.
157. Id at 475.
158. Id
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and other federal agencies on the effects various federal actions will
have on historic sites.' 59 The existence of this Council, coupled with
the requirement under the NHPA that the Council be consulted about
the effects of federally assisted projects on historic sites, should forecast
the deferral to the Council's opinion on the aesthetic effects of federal
action on historic sites. This Council, however, need not be consulted
about property not listed on the National Register. 60
V. THE AESTHETIC COMPROMISE
All three of these cases foretell deferral in landmarks cases by the
courts to the administrative agency charged with aesthetic determina-
tions.' 6 ' In Penn Central, the litigants themselves acquiesced in the
aesthetic determinations made by the Landmarks Commission. The
Charleston Center case, and other NEPA cases, indicate that the Advi-
sory Council on Historic Preservation will be the arbiter of good taste
in cases involving the overlap of NEPA and historic preservation. In
the City of Paris litigation, unless the court defers to the municipal
landmarks commission the decision as to the aesthetic considerations,
thereby affirming that body's decision not to designate the City of Paris
Building a San Francisco landmark, the court will be required to an-
swer the aesthetic questions posed by the litigants.
The gravest danger of legislation allowing local committees to des-
ignate landmarks, and then forbid their modification on aesthetic
grounds alone, is the impossibility of reversal of such determinations in
light of the fact that scarcely any two people agree on what is aestheti-
cally pleasing. As the New York Court of Appeals noted, these ordi-
nances need improvement. 162 Advocates of absolute preservation of
landmark buildings argue that such monuments are irreplaceable.
Landmark designation, however, is scarcely a two-way street. Such or-
159. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470(f) and 470(i) (1976).
160. 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1976). It is interesting to note that in 1976, Congress amended
§ 470(a) to permit the Secretary of the Interior "to withold from disclosure to the public, informa-
tion relating to the location of sites ... listed on the National Register whenever he determines
that the disclosure of specific information would create a risk of destruction or harm to such sites
." 16 U.S.C. § 470a (1976).
161. See Goldstone, Aesthetics in HistoricDistricts, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 379 (1971) on
the daily aesthetic judgments required of the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commis-
sion. He states that the "drafters of the Landmarks Preservation Law felt that such a Commission
of devoted and experienced non-specialists would be best equipped to reach just decisions on the
complex, aesthetic problems it must resolve." Id at 385. This author does not believe any group
can necessarily ever resolve such issues, or that one should.
162. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
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on aesthetic grounds, of the status of landmarks. Inasmuch as the
courts are unlikely to take a hard look at aesthetic decisions, buildings
designated as landmarks pursuant to ordinances such as that of New
York City are effectively sealed. 1
63
In both the Grand Central Terminal and the City of Paris Build-
ing cases, the owners proposed additions which, at least arguably,
would not detract from the aesthetic character of the older portions of
those buildings, and which would add high quality modem design to
them. In the Grand Central Terminal case, the building has, from its
original design, been an elaborate base for a tower which has never
been built. The proposal for the new Nieman-Marcus store in San
Francisco preserves within it the "landmark" features of the City of
Paris Building. Yet, in both cases, the argument that the aesthetic in-
consistency between the old and the new is simply unacceptable to the
beholder has been made, and in Penn Central, victorious. Similarly,
the plaintiffs in the Charleston Center case complain of the lack of vis-
ual harmony between the proposed new complex and the historic dis-
trict in which it is to be located. The three cases form a classic trilogy
on the impossibility of any group of people agreeing on, much less ar-
ticulating, what is aesthetically pleasing.
These three cases also illustrate the expense to society of sealing
off, in terms of both size and style, old buildings by landmark designa-
tion. The increased income and tax revenues the proposed construction
could generate is lost by the prohibition. Also, the resale value of des-
ignated single building landmarks is severely impaired because of the
limited uses to which the building can thereafter be put. The addi-
tional cost to society, however, is ultimately higher. If those owners of
landmarks who would commission innovative additions to such struc-
163. It is not unimportant that in the Penn Central decision the Supreme Court noted that
there were 53 designated single building landmarks in New York City between 14th and 59th
Streets in 1977 and over 400 throughout the City. 438 U.S. at 132, 134, n.31. According to the
New York Times, Feb. 20, 1980, B 1, at col. 2, there are 564 designated single building landmarks
in New York City, only three years later. The most recent designation is that of the four-story
Isaac L. Rice Mansion on Riverside Drive at 89th Street. The designation was made in response
to the owner's plan to sell the building to a developer, and has been vigorously opposed by the
owner. The Rice, Mansion, however, is one of only two remaining "mansions" on Riverside
Drive. (The other is already a designated landmark.) The stated reason of the New York City
Landmarks Commission for the designation of the Rice Mansion was the consideration by the
Commission that the building evokes a time "when affluent New Yorkers commissioned architects
to build elegant free-standing mansions of diverse design for them." Id
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tures, modifications designed by architects of the highest caliber and
sensitivity to the special features of the old structures, are prohibited
from changing their buildings pursuant to such plans, several losses
will result. First, the architectural prototypes incorporating the old
within the new without obliterating the old will not develop. Second,
in the absence of that prototype as a compromise between preservation
and total destruction, a visual incentive to preserve old buildings which
are not sealed by official designation as landmarks will not exist. The
choices will remain the bulldozer or landmark designation. Practicality
dictates that the bulldozer will claim more property than landmark
commissions. In addition, landmark status will continue to grow as a
weapon, not a reward.164
VI. CONCLUSION
What is needed to save the architectural past of the urban centers
of the United States is an architectural prototype, a compromise which
is aesthetically and economically successful so as to satisfy the chief
demands of both factions. If, however, the single building landmark
designation process remains one whereby preservationists may seal off
old buildings from any modification purely on aesthetic grounds, no
voluntary preservation of the magnificent features of our architectural
past can develop.'65 Indeed, what would exist to preserve now if
preservationists one hundred years ago had prevented the construction
of the buildings they seek now to "save?"
No one today actually knows whether Phillip Johnson's designs or
Marcel Breuer's designs-around or on top of the architectural past-
may be more beautiful to our grandchildren than the past on which
they rest. For the same reasons that it has always been impossible, or
at least extremely difficult, for anyone to determine what is beautiful.
Neither legislatures nor courts should make or permit governmental
bodies to make those determinations, much less impose them upon pri-
vate owners of urban property. As one court said in 1925: "Certain
legislatures might consider that it was more important to cultivate a
taste for jazz than Beethoven, for posters than for Rembrandt and for
164. Id
165. The sole voluntary preservation tool now in existence is the tax incentives. See note 5
supra. But these benefits are not available for non-registered or designated buildings.
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limericks than for Keats.... The world would be at a continual seesaw
if aesthetic considerations were permitted to govern the use of police
power." 166
Linda Pinkerton
166. City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. at 661-62, 148 N.E. at 844. See
also "To Preserve or Not? That is the Question For a Neo-Neon Age," Wall St. Jrnl., March 28,
1980, at 1, col. 4, where the comment is made: "Now, some preservationists ... worry about losing
some of the architecture that earlier preservationists sought to preserve us from." Id This article
is particularly significant in citing the current enthusiasm for commercial neon signs and bill-
boards-the very signs and billboards which legislatures and courts are finally getting around to
banning as too ugly for our roadsides. Again, the ironies of the situation emphasize the need to
return to the approach forbidding governmental intervention in matters of aesthetics.
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